"Trade Unions at Whose Service?" Coercive Partnerships and Partnership in Coercion in Turkey’s metal sector by Koçer, Rüya Gökhan
www.ssoar.info
"Trade Unions at Whose Service?" Coercive
Partnerships and Partnership in Coercion in
Turkey’s metal sector
Koçer, Rüya Gökhan
Veröffentlichungsversion / Published Version
Zeitschriftenartikel / journal article
Zur Verfügung gestellt in Kooperation mit / provided in cooperation with:
Rainer Hampp Verlag
Empfohlene Zitierung / Suggested Citation:
Koçer, R. G. (2007). "Trade Unions at Whose Service?" Coercive Partnerships and Partnership in Coercion in Turkey’s
metal sector. Industrielle Beziehungen : Zeitschrift für Arbeit, Organisation und Management, 14(3), 245-269. https://
nbn-resolving.org/urn:nbn:de:0168-ssoar-357300
Nutzungsbedingungen:
Dieser Text wird unter einer Deposit-Lizenz (Keine
Weiterverbreitung - keine Bearbeitung) zur Verfügung gestellt.
Gewährt wird ein nicht exklusives, nicht übertragbares,
persönliches und beschränktes Recht auf Nutzung dieses
Dokuments. Dieses Dokument ist ausschließlich für
den persönlichen, nicht-kommerziellen Gebrauch bestimmt.
Auf sämtlichen Kopien dieses Dokuments müssen alle
Urheberrechtshinweise und sonstigen Hinweise auf gesetzlichen
Schutz beibehalten werden. Sie dürfen dieses Dokument
nicht in irgendeiner Weise abändern, noch dürfen Sie
dieses Dokument für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke
vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, aufführen, vertreiben oder
anderweitig nutzen.
Mit der Verwendung dieses Dokuments erkennen Sie die
Nutzungsbedingungen an.
Terms of use:
This document is made available under Deposit Licence (No
Redistribution - no modifications). We grant a non-exclusive, non-
transferable, individual and limited right to using this document.
This document is solely intended for your personal, non-
commercial use. All of the copies of this documents must retain
all copyright information and other information regarding legal
protection. You are not allowed to alter this document in any
way, to copy it for public or commercial purposes, to exhibit the
document in public, to perform, distribute or otherwise use the
document in public.
By using this particular document, you accept the above-stated
conditions of use.
Industrielle Beziehungen, 14(3): 245-269 
ISSN (print) 0943-2779, ISSN (internet) 1862-0035, © Rainer Hampp Verlag, www.Hampp-Verlag.de 
Rüya Gökhan Koçer*
“Trade Unions at Whose Service?” Coercive Partnerships and 
Partnership in Coercion in Turkey’s metal sector**
Abstract – Partnership in coercion is defined as cooperation between trade unions and employers 
at the expense of workers’ interests. It differs from coercive partnership by trade unions’ not 
mandatory but willing participation for furtherance of their own interests that are detached 
from those of their members. The legal changes after 1980 in Turkey created the basic 
conditions for both of these partnerships patterns. The analysis of the metal industry 
bargaining system reveals that there are three additional factors which rendered partnership in 
coercion possible in this sector: employers’ needs, weak trade union internal democracy and 
competition among trade unions. However the examination of some other industries in Turkey 
shows that partnership patterns in the metal sector cannot be easily used to make 
generalizations. Yet it possible to consider them as extreme forms which reveal a fundamental 
feature of partnership clearly: the nature and outcome of partnership are determined by 
complex interdependencies which are beyond the immediate control of those who are actually 
becoming partners.  
„Gewerkschaften – zu wessen Diensten?“ Partnerschaft zwischen 
Zwang und Kollaboration in der türkischen Metallindustrie 
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Metallindustrie ermittelt drei weitere Faktoren, die die partnerschaftliche Kollaboration in  
diesem Sektor möglich gemacht haben: die Bedürfnisse der Arbeitgeber, der fragwürdige Zu-
stand der innergewerkschaftlichen Demokratie und der Wettbewerb zwischen den Gewerk-
schaften. Der Vergleich mit anderen Sektoren ergibt, dass die Partnerschaftsmuster in der 
Metallindustrie sich nicht ohne weiteres verallgemeinern lassen. Art und Ergebnis von Partner-
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Introduction
Partnership between employers and trade unions has been one of the prominent top-
ics in contemporary industrial relations (see for example: Edwards et al. 2006; Ba-
con/Blyton 2006; Lucio/Stuart 2005; Ashwin 2004; Terry 2003; Haynes/Allen 2001; 
Marks et al. 1998; Kelly 1997). The essence of partnership can be described as the 
determination of employers and trade unions to take joint action towards realization 
of their mutually recognized interests. Although this description seems to be clear, the 
exact usefulness of partnership for a trade union can be represented in different ways. 
It can be considered as one of the revitalization strategies that trade unions may adopt 
together with recruitment, mergers, coalitions, political action and international links 
(Frege/Kelly 2003). However it is also possible to argue that, trade unions can satisfy 
workers’ needs only through successful engagement with employers in an environ-
ment where both the state and employers do not envisage a crucial role for them. 
Thus under certain conditions partnership may become the precondition for trade 
union effectiveness rather than one of the strategies for being effective (Boxall/ 
Haynes 1997: 568-571). Thus one can see that for trade unions partnership may ap-
pear as an optional choice or as necessity. Yet in either situation, partnership is not consid-
ered as an impediment to the ability of trade unions to represent the interests of their 
members. 
 However the examination of the relationship between trade unions and employ-
ers in ex-Soviet states (Ashwin 2004; Kubicek 2002) leads one to ask whether trade 
unions involved in partnership with employers can remain as representative entities if 
their existence depends on their usefulness for employers and/or willingness of em-
ployers to tolerate them. Obviously under such conditions the relationship between 
trade unions and employers can be best named as coercive partnership in the sense that 
trade unions would be part of such a relationship reluctantly and only for mere sur-
vival (Lucio/Stuart 2005: 809). The defining feature of coercive partnership is that in 
such a relationship trade unions are “incorporated into making concessions” for bene-
fit of employers. (Bacon/Blyton 2006: 225-229).
In this article by focusing on the bargaining system in Turkey’s metal industry I 
will show that there is another variant of partnership, that is, partnership in coercion
which is based on not reluctant but willing cooperation of trade unions with employ-
ers at the expense of workers’ interests.
Theoretical Framework 
Partnership in coercion as a union strategy can be described as trade unions’ collabo-
ration with employers not merely for survival but for furtherance of their own inter-
ests which are detached from those of their members. I argue that this kind of rela-
tionship may emerge under conditions that are likely to generate coercive partner-
ships. Thus partnership in coercion can be understood by first exploring the nature of 
coercive partnership and its influences on the union behavior. 
Coercive partnership and its determinants 
The possibility that trade unions may be forced into coercive partnerships by employ-
ers has been acknowledged in the literature (Bacon/Blyton 2006; Frege/Kelly 2003; 
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Boxall/Haynes 1997; Kelly 1997). However, it is not easy to identify the exact condi-
tions which may lead to coercive partnerships. In this respect, observations such as 
“partnership often takes place on a terrain where labor’s power is limited” (Edwards 
et al. 2006: 127), “partnership need not to be underpinned by equivalence of power” 
(Haynes/Allen 2001: 178) or “it is undeniable that partnership reflects union weak-
ness” (Terry 2003: 468) hint that power inequality between trade unions and employ-
ers alone would not necessarily lead to coercive partnerships. However the ability and 
willingness of trade unions, despite power inequality, to oppose employers while being 
involved in partnership is suggested as an indicator of non-coercive type of partner-
ship (Ashwin 2004: 42). This means that a partnership relation would not be coercive 
as long as trade unions are able and willing to “create both opportunity and threat for 
the employers” (Haynes/Allen 2001: 182).  
Job insecurity appears to be the primary factor which prevents trade unions from 
posing a serious threat to employers (Bacon/Blyton 2006; Edwards et al. 2006; and 
see also Gennard 2007: 96). However, as in Germany, institutional support may en-
able trade unions to acquire the capacity to pose threats without being occupied with 
recruitment, thus may reduce the impact of job insecurity on union strength and in 
this way prevent coercive partnerships (Frege/Kelly 2003; but see also Hassel 2007). 
On the other hand, certain institutional arrangements in a high unemployment envi-
ronment may also render trade unions very vulnerable to coercive partnership as in 
Russia where, due to Soviet inheritance, trade unions function as welfare departments 
of enterprises and thus their existence become very dependent on employers’ consent 
(Ashwin 2004: 32-33; Kubicek 2002: 613). However it is possible to face confusing 
mixes of institutional support and job insecurity: for example it is difficult to judge if 
and when a partnership relation becomes coercive in the post-1997 Britain where 
partnership is encouraged by the Labor government via positive incentives (Terry 
2003: 463), the legal framework tends to protect non-representative trade unions 
(Smith/Burton 2006: 408) and unemployment might be a regionalized problem (Ba-
con/Blyton 2006).  
Taking these into account one should only make a cautious observation: coercive 
partnership is likely to occur in an environment where there is no job security and the 
institutional/legal structure does not provide any protection for trade unions, thus 
trade unions are deprived from the ability to pose a serious threat. To this one should 
add Lucio/Stuart’s argument: trade unions would be involved in coercive partnership 
relations with employers only when they have no other alternative and, as they acquire 
strategic information, they would gradually transform this relationship so as to repre-
sent their members properly (Lucio/Stuart 2005: 809). 
This overall assessment has a basic implication: trade unions would be part of co-
ercive partnership only as a last resort due to necessity resulting from job insecurity and 
legal/institutional environment, and, coercive partnership is a dynamic relationship 
which would, through the actions of involved trade union, evolve into something 
more advantageous for workers. Therefore for trade unions coercive partnership 
would never be an optional choice.
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Partnership in coercion and its limits  
The very name coercive partnership implies a relationship between employer and trade 
union in which the trade union is forced to accept conditions which are beneficial for 
the employer but unfavorable or irrelevant for trade union members. The expectation 
that trade unions would try to change this situation is probably derived from the idea 
that unions are “organizations with explicit commitment to democratic policy deter-
mination” (Hyman 2001: 211) thus their interests cannot be fundamentally detached 
from those of their members. For partnership (coercive or otherwise) “may lead to a 
diminution of union/member relationship” (Terry 2003: 470) while providing gains 
only for the union itself and thus may cause grass roots alienation or revolt (Hyman 
1996: 71). However given that partnership involves comparison and management of 
various risks (Lucio/Stuart 2005) it should theoretically be possible that, for a trade 
union, the risks generated by remaining within coercive partnership may always be 
lower than risks emanating from any other alternative strategy, especially if those risks 
are evaluated from the point of view of union leadership rather than that of the rank 
and file. In other words, despite the expectation to the contrary, there is no theoretical 
impediment to envisage coercive partnership being an optional choice for a union rather 
than necessity. Indeed from entirely rational choice perspective, one can envisage an 
institutional/legal environment in which, as long as rank/file resentment is contained, 
retaining coercive partnership may serve a trade union better in terms of organiza-
tional strength and material gains than any other form of relationship with employers. 
This kind of partnership then should be called partnership in coercion in the sense that 
the only party which is not gaining anything, and thus which is ‘coerced’, would be the 
members, while the employer and trade union become partners who benefit from this 
situation. Obviously there is a limit to this. For, if trade unions lose all their credibility 
among their members they will also lose their central utility to employers (Terry 2003: 
470). Therefore, to be useful for employers and thus to be able to further their own 
interests, trade unions involved in partnership in coercion must retain a degree of credibil-
ity in order to prevent a rank and file revolt. Consequently, as a defining feature of 
partnership in coercion, employers involved in such a relationship should actively help 
trade unions to contain rank and file resentment.  
No doubt, imagining a trade union which systematically serves its own and em-
ployer’s interests rather than serving its members while enjoying employers’ aid is 
counter-intuitive for anyone with a notion of industrial relations derived from the 
Western European experience. However it is crucial to remember Hyman’s warning 
that “what is a trade union?” and “what does it mean to be a trade union member?” 
will receive different answers according to national context (Hyman 2001: 211).  
In this paper, by focusing on bargaining dynamics of Turkey’s metal industry, I 
will reveal how an anti-union legal environment, combined with persistent job insecu-
rity, may generate coercive partnerships and partnership in coercion simultaneously in accor-
dance with employers’ demands and the degree of trade unions’ internal democracy.  
Data
The analysis presented here is based on 35 semi-structured interviews which were 
made during the fieldwork in Turkey in 2006. All the interviews were made on the 
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condition of anonymity and they took between 45 minutes to 2 hours. Interviewees 
include the officials of all three bargaining trade unions, two employers’ organizations 
and important sectoral associations in the metal sector, officials of the Ministry of 
Labor and Social Security, general managers of two metal sector firms and some in-
dustrial relations experts. Moreover in order to compare the metal sector with other 
sectors interviews were also made with the officials of employers’ organizations in the 
construction, chemicals, and textile/clothing industries, the officials of two textile 
trade unions, two experts of the public sector employers’ organization and the officials 
of two peak employers’ associations. In addition to this material, the publications of 
trade unions and employers’ organizations in the metal, textile and construction sec-
tors, daily newspapers, bargaining agreements, various statistical sources and prior 
academic research on Turkey’s industrial relations have been examined and used.  
In the following pages first I will give a short overview of industrial relations in 
Turkey with special focus on the post-1980 legal environment which created the con-
ditions generating coercive partnerships and partnership in coercion. Second, I will 
analyze the metal industry from the employers’ perspective and reveal the logic behind 
the simultaneous and interdependent existence of coercive partnership and partner-
ship in coercion in this sector both at sectoral and workplace levels. Finally, in discus-
sion section, I will try to explain why some trade unions become partners in coercion 
while others become coerced partners and try to make some inferences about the 
other sectors in Turkey by using the features of the metal sector bargaining system as 
reference. The paper ends with possible conclusions that can be drawn from this 
analysis as to the notion of partnership between employers and trade unions in gen-
eral.
Industrial relations in Turkey: a brief history 
Establishing trade unions has been allowed in Turkey since 1947, but the right to 
strike was granted and collective bargaining was properly legalized only in 1963 by the 
enactment of new industrial relations laws. According to these laws, which shaped the 
industrial relations of Turkey until 1980, trade unions could conduct collective bar-
gaining at workplace or sectoral level provided that they represent the majority of 
workers at chosen level (Talas 1992: 176). The right to strike could be used when bar-
gaining negotiations fail or when employers infringe collective agreements. This per-
missive legal structure created “a very favorable climate for the development of trade 
unionism” and already by 1967 more than 300 new trade unions were established 
(Jackson 1971: 72-73). The number of trade unions reached to 733 in 1980 (Tokol 
1997: 112). Similarly the total number of unionized workers increased from 295.000 in 
1963 to 5.721.000 in 1980 (Tokol 1997: 109) and union density reached 27 percent in 
1979 (Cam 2002: 98). In the period of 1963-1980 the majority of collective agreements 
were signed at workplace level and employers’ attempts to accomplish more encom-
passing agreements met fierce resistance of trade unions (Tokol 1997: 135-136). Ob-
viously, in this period, trade unions enjoyed quite a powerful position at workplace 
level vis-à-vis employers.
During the 1960’s majority of trade unions were affiliated with national confed-
eration TÜRK-ùú (Türkiye ùûçi Sendikaları Konfederasyonu) which was promoting the 
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idea of “remaining above the politics” and was encouraging cooperative approach in 
collective bargaining (Jackson 1971: 73; Talas 1992: 176). However, gradually some 
politically autonomous and class-based trade unions distanced themselves from 
TÜRK-ùú and established the Confederation of Revolutionary Trade Unions DùSK 
(Devrimci ùûçi Sendikaları Konfederasyonu) in 1967. Consequently during the 1970’s 
the monopoly of TÜRK-ùú on trade union movement was increasingly challenged by 
DùSK and some other smaller confederations. In fact in the 1970’s cooperative ap-
proach of TÜRK-ùú lost its credibility, and as the economic situation deteriorated, 
strikes became widespread across the country (Sönmez 1992: 125; Cizre 1991: 58-59).  
1980 was the turning point for Turkey: in January new stability measures were in-
troduced in order to cope with high inflation and unemployment (Herslag 1988: 38-
44) and thereby the hitherto prevailing policy of import substitution was replaced by 
the project of creating an open market economy (Aydın 2005: 43-44). In September 
the army assumed the political power by organizing a coup and declared its full com-
mitment to the new economic programme (Yıldızoølu/Marguiles 1988). During the 
following three years of military dictatorship all trade unions with exception of those 
affiliated with TÜRK-ùú were either temporarily closed or completely banned, collec-
tive bargaining and strikes were prohibited while the legal system of Turkey was sub-
stantially altered. As a part of this legal restructuring, industrial relations laws of 1963 
were repealed and much more restrictive laws were enacted (Boratav 2005: 147-164; 
Aydın 2005: 52-56).
Comparing the pre and post-1980 legal environments 
The post-1980 legislation replaced the previous accreditation condition for conducting 
collective bargaining (which was based on simple majority) with a very strict threshold 
obligation: in order to become the bargaining agent for a certain workplace trade un-
ions were to represent at least 10 percent of the workers in the relevant sector and 
more than 50 percent of the workers at the workplace. It is important to note that, 
due to the check-off system, membership fees would be paid to trade unions only 
when they were recognized as official bargaining agents. Thus in the post-1980 period, 
failure to meet the thresholds meant complete bankruptcy for trade unions. This im-
plied that, unlike in Germany where legal environment minimized the importance of 
recruitment (Frege/Kelly 2003; Hassel 2007), trade unions in Turkey would be per-
manently engaged in the search for new members.  
In order to understand the real implications of this accreditation procedure on 
partnership dynamics, we must also consider the individual labor law of the post-1980 
period: this legislation, which was initially enacted in 1971, had granted employers the 
right to dismiss workers as they saw fit without any explanation or justification 
(Bakırcı 2004: 49). However, according to the pre-1980 version of the individual con-
tract law, employers had to make severance payment to the dismissed workers in pro-
portion to the length of their employment. Owing to the large sums imposed on em-
ployers by this system and the prohibition to establish any form of solidarity fund, 
large-scale lay-offs were prevented to a certain extent (Talas 1992: 111). However, 
during the period of the military dictatorship (1980-83), the individual contract law 
too was altered so that severance payments were subjected to an upper limit, which 
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restricted the amount of severance payments regardless of workers’ length of em-
ployment (AJANS TÜBA 1989: 19-24). This alteration substantially undermined the 
pre-1980 role of severance payments as disincentive against lay-offs, and rendered 
workers very vulnerable to the threat of dismissal during the post-1980 period. Al-
though the new individual contract law enacted in 2003 obliged employers to provide 
a ‘just cause’ for dismissals, the rise in unionization expected to be triggered by this 
law had not yet taken place by 2006 (interview #20 / 29.03.2006). The difficulties 
involved in legal procedure and persistent high unemployment kept ensured that job 
security remained a permanent concern for workers despite new legal protection. 
 Obviously these conditions put trade unions in a very weak position vis-à-vis em-
ployers: while the threshold system forced trade unions to be permanently occupied 
with recruitment, the lack of employment security for individual workers created vari-
ous routes for employers to avoid or manipulate unionization. For example employ-
ers, by using the threat of dismissal, could always diminish the willingness of workers 
to unionize or could force them to affiliate with a cooperative union, thus undermin-
ing assertive unions’ ability to qualify as bargaining agents for a particular workplace 
(Sugur/Sugur 2005: 279; Cam 1999: 704).  
Another important difference between the pre- and post-1980 legal environ-
ments, which was crucial for partnership dynamics, is that according to the pre-1980 
laws trade unions could organize strikes during the disputes arising from the bargain-
ing process and they could also strike in order to deal with employers’ infringement of 
collective agreements (Jackson 1971: 72). However the post-1980 legislation only al-
lowed strikes which were related to collective bargaining negotiations (Cizre 1991: 61). 
It was no longer possible to use strikes in order to prevent infringement of collective 
agreements (Nichols/Suøur 2005: 32). Obviously, this restriction undermined unions’ 
ability to pose threats considerably and also, as in Czech Republic, Hungary and Slo-
vakia (Gennard 2007: 99), reduced the attractiveness of trade unions for workers who 
could no longer expect serious support from trade unions against arbitrary manage-
ment decisions.  
One can see that, in the post-1980 legal environment, in order to survive, trade 
unions were permanently obliged to recruit new members so as to be able to remain 
above the thresholds, while all potential and actual members were subjected to job 
insecurity resulting from high unemployment and lack of proper legal protection. 
Moreover attractiveness of membership was further reduced due to limited ability of 
trade unions to pose threats against infringements of collective agreements. Obviously 
these were the conditions which were likely to generate coercive partnerships between 
employers and trade unions given that trade unions’ existence was largely depended 
on their ability to render themselves useful or at least not dangerous for employers 
instead of solely focusing on representation of workers’ interests. Not surprisingly of 
more than 700 unions of the pre-1980 period only about 90 did survive in the new 
legal environment, and many of these survivors remained dangerously close to the 
sectoral threshold (Tokol 1997: 112-237; ÇSGB 1994b: 71).Consequently by 1997 the 
union density declined to around 15 percent, almost half of the 1979 level (Cam 2002: 
98).
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However, from purely pragmatist perspective one can argue that the predicament 
of achieving permanent expansion under constant job insecurity which leads to coercive partner-
ships can be transformed by trade unions in order to develop a winning strategy: secur-
ing employers’ support so as to use the constant job insecurity as an instrument of recruitment,
and thereby using the conditions which likely to generate coercive partnership to establish 
partnership in coercion. Obviously pursuing such a strategy would be possible only for 
elite led trade unions which could be very receptive to the needs and demands of dif-
ferent employers while containing rank and file resentment by using authoritarian 
measures. In the next section, by examining the post-1980 developments in Turkey’s 
metal industry from employers’ perspective I will reveal how partnership in coercion and 
coercive partnership have simultaneously developed in the post-1980 legal environment in 
accordance with employers’ demands and trade union strategies.  
Metal sector: what did employers need and what could unions deliver?  
During the pre-1980 period in an environment characterized by hundreds of unions 
and workplace level collective agreements, the employers’ organization of the metal 
sector, the Metal Industry Employers’ Union, MESS (Türkiye Metal Sanayicileri 
Sendikası), was the leading proponent of sectoral collective bargaining. The MESS has 
become famous for its strict opposition to small trade unions, to existence of more 
than one trade union in a single workplace and to industrial action of any kind. Ac-
cording to the MESS, workplace unionism caused leap-frogging wage increases as 
each new workplace bargaining took the previous ones as its reference. Although 
sectoral agreements could be attained in the metal sector during the 1970’s, these were 
accomplished only after fierce struggles with trade unions (MESS 1999: 390-479). Not 
surprisingly the MESS welcomed the new legal framework of the post 1980 period 
which realized many of its goals: due to thresholds workplace unionism was no longer 
possible and industrial action was strictly restricted.  
However, the new legal framework had a peculiar feature: workplace unionism 
was prohibited but the workplace was still defined as the natural unit of bargaining. 
Collective agreements could be signed either for a workplace or for a group of work-
places while trade unions could only be sectoral. Hence, in theory it was possible for 
sectoral trade unions to ask for different terms for each workplace and thereby con-
tinue workplace bargaining. Obviously given the vulnerability of trade unions, the 
more likely outcome would be that employers would benefit from this situation by 
dictating the conditions of bargaining in their workplaces as they saw fit regardless of 
harmonization attempts across the sector. In this environment only way for the MESS 
to attain sectoral agreements was to convince as many employers as possible to act 
collectively so as to form a very large group of workplaces and sign a single agreement on 
behalf of this group. In other words, the MESS had to persuade employers that they 
would be better off by joining the group and thereby forgo the right to bargain indi-
vidually with trade unions in spite of the fact that most employers had achieved a 
dominant position in their workplaces vis-à-vis trade unions.  
This predicament of the MESS was exacerbated further: for given that not all the 
workplaces in the MESS group will be organized by the same union, the MESS would 
have to convince different trade unions to accept identical collective agreements in 
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order to attain a de facto sectoral agreement. Obviously, trying to convince trade unions 
to agree to identical agreements would create a fertile ground for (not-necessarily-
cooperative) trade union alliances. Consequently, the emergence of non-cooperative 
trade union alliances would jeopardize the unity of employers and thereby undermine 
the harmonization attempts across the sector given that, individual employers, instead 
of confronting an alliance of unions collectively, could easily dominate or get rid of 
single trade unions at their own workplaces. 
Indeed one can see that the new legal framework has substantially altered the lo-
gic of collective action for metal sector employers: while during the pre-1980 period 
they were motivated to act collectively in order to counter increasing strength and 
militancy of trade unions with which they could not cope with individually, the legal 
environment of the post-1980 period has provided them, at least in theory, sufficient 
individual strength to prevent or manipulate unionization. Therefore, so far as wages 
were concerned, the new logic of collective action for metal employers could be prem-
ised on three grounds: 1) prudence (i.e., pre-empting re-emergence of militant union-
ism among skilled metal workers), 2) preventing the use of wages in competition 
among established firms 3) precluding new firms from entering the market by careful 
manipulation of labor costs. 
 Under these conditions, in order to establish a sustainable sectoral bargaining 
system the MESS needed a union which, during the sectoral bargaining negotiations, 
would refrain from any assertive attitude and refuse to cooperate with other unions 
while being strong enough in the entire sector not to be endangered by threshold 
conditions and thus not to be intimidated by employers who might want to deunion-
ize their workplaces in case they did not want to comply with MESS’ bargaining pol-
icy.
When the threshold procedure for unionization was introduced in 1983 at the 
end of the military dictatorship, only 4 of the 23 trade unions in the metal sector were 
qualified as bargaining agents with which the MESS had to negotiate (MESS 1999: 
396; ÇSGB 1994a: 77) Of these Türk-Metal proved to be the trade union which was 
capable of and willing to serve employers’ interests. It would become the partner that 
the MESS was looking for. 
Türk-Metal has been a staunch supporter of ultra-nationalist ideology since its es-
tablishment in 1973. However in the pre-1980 period it was affiliated with the bread-
and-butter oriented and “non-political” confederation TÜRK-ùú (Talas 1992: 158; 
Nichols et al. 2002: 34) instead of the ultra-nationalist confederation MùSK. Owing to 
this affiliation, Türk-Metal managed to continue its activities without interruption 
during the period of military dictatorship (1980-1983). During this period Türk-Metal 
also recognized the needs of the MESS, and revealed its willingness to cooperate by 
declaring that it did not see “any contradiction between the interests of capital and 
labor” (Nichols/Suøur 2005: 215).  
Consequently when collective bargaining resumed in 1984 under the new legal 
framework, the MESS and Türk-Metal established a system of bargaining in which, 
while all other trade unions were part of coercive partnership with the MESS, Türk-Metal 
and the MESS had become partners in coercion. Despite some challenges, this system has 
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remained intact until today. In the next two sections I will show the mutual gains of 
Türk-Metal and the MESS within this system and the way in which they cope with 
sporadic challenges created by the other trade unions and Türk-Metal’s rank/file. 
Metal sector bargaining system:
Coercive partnerships and partnership in coercion  
Actors (see figure 1): There were in total five bargaining unions between 1984 and 
2006 in the metal sector. Of these Öz-Demir-ùû and Çelik-Sen have disappeared due 
to amalgamations in the early 1990’s1 while, only three unions, leftist Birleûik-Metal,
liberal-Islamic Çelik-ùû and ultra-nationalist Türk-Metal remained as the threshold 
meeting bargaining entities. On the employers’ side, the MESS would be the only 
bargaining actor through the entire period. Although some rebelling members of the 
MESS established another employers’ organization, The Union of Metal Employers, 
the UME (Metal Sanayicileri ùûveren Sendikası: Mesis), this entity failed to grow.
Figure 1:
Metal sector  
bargaining
system
                                                          
1  The exact amalgamation story is rather complex: facing the danger of falling under the 
sectoral threshold both Çelik-Sen (in 1988) and Çelik-ùû (in 1991) joined Öz-Demir-ùû
which then changed into Öz-Çelik-ùû. However, in 2003 Öz-Çelik-ùû changed its name in-
to Çelik-ùû in order to revive the spirit of Çelik-ùû. On the other hand Birleûik Metal was 
the name which was assumed by Otomobil-ùû after its rather symbolic amalgamation with 
Türkiye Maden- ùû, which was quite a famous union from the pre-1980 period and was 
banned by the military government. When Türkiye Maden- ùû was re-established in 1993; 
Otomobil-Is amalgamated with it and the new entity was called Birleûik (i.e United) Metal. 
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Functioning (see figure 1): At the beginning of each bargaining period , that is, every 
two years the MESS starts negotiating with Türk-Metal (1) on behalf of those firms in 
“the group” (i.e. firms affiliated with the MESS) whose workplaces are organized by 
Türk-Metal. Once an agreement is attained, the MESS enforces the other trade unions 
to accept this agreement unconditionally (2/3). Therefore all the firms included in the 
MESS group have the same collective agreement regardless of the trade unions which 
organize their workplaces. The wage level determined by this de facto sectoral agree-
ment (1) is binding for all those firms affiliated with the MESS with few exceptions 
while it is considered as the wage-ceiling in non-unionized workplaces. However, in 
those firms which are unionized by Çelik-ùû or Birleûik-Metal but which are not affili-
ated with the MESS there is a small possibility of exceeding this sectoral wage.  
From MESS’ perspective, this bargaining system has two merits: Firstly MESS 
can dictate its own terms quite easily while negotiating with Türk-Metal thanks to the 
latter‘s principles of “considering the interests of the country more important than 
those of the union” and endorsing “dialogue and compromise” (Türk-Metal 2007: 8, 
22). Secondly the strict refusal of Türk-Metal to cooperate with the other unions pre-
vents the emergence of formidable and assertive union alliances that might jeopardize 
unity of employers. Indeed, Türk-Metal’s adherence to the policy of permanent ap-
peasement with employers, and the determination of MESS for “not changing even a 
single line of the Türk-Metal/MESS agreement while negotiating with other trade 
unions” (interview #14 / 21.03.06) have precluded the other unions (Birleûik-Metal 
and Çelik-ùû) from refusing to sign an agreement, the terms of which were actually 
decided by Türk-Metal and the MESS. Consequently the MESS managed to impose a 
de facto sectoral collective agreement and achieve a degree of harmonization across the 
sector.
The most important advantage provided by this system for Türk-Metal has been 
the permanent support from almost all the MESS employers which ensured that Türk-
Metal’s membership would expand and its finances would remain secure. For this 
pattern of bargaining could only persist if Türk-Metal becomes the strongest union in 
the sector so as to keep the workforce obedient and the other unions in check. To 
underpin this, the MESS members adopted a policy of closed shop: in the MESS 
workplaces which are unionized by Türk-Metal any new employee is forced to affiliate 
with Türk-Metal in order to start working (Nichols/Suøur 2005: 221), and members of 
Türk-Metal who contemplate leaving the union are threatened by employers with 
dismissal (interview #30 / 20.04.06). In this way entering Türk-Metal workplaces is 
rendered extremely difficult for the other trade unions. In other words Türk-Metal 
managed to obtain permanent support from employers so as to use the job insecurity as 
an instrument of recruitment. In exchange for this support Türk-Metal allows the MESS to 
pursue a sectoral wage policy in accordance with employers’ interests without being 
challenged by workers (interview #29 / 20.04.2006, interview #33 / 25.04.2006, Ni-
chols/Suøur 2005: 209-211, Nichols et al. 2002: 29-31) Therefore one should call the 
relationship between Türk-Metal and the MESS as partnership in coercion.
Consequently as depicted in figure 2, during the post-1980 period Türk-Metal‘s 
strength kept on growing while the other unions remained dangerously close to the 
sectoral threshold. Thus they increasingly refrained from assertive attitudes during 
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their negotiations with the MESS in order to avoid employer retaliations which may 
lead to loosing their workplaces to Türk-Metal or even to complete bankruptcy if they 
fall under 10 percent sectoral representation threshold. Accordingly the main preoc-
cupation of these trade unions has become trying to organize public enterprises and 
firms which are not affiliated with the MESS while retaining their MESS affiliated 
workplaces by accepting the MESS/Türk-Metal agreement unconditionally (interview 
#30 / 20.04.06, interview #33 / 25.04.06). In other words for Birleûik-Metal and 
Çelik-ùû cooperating with the MESS is for mere survival. However, as expected by 
Lucio/Stuart from coerced trade unions (Lucio/Stuart 2005: 809), both Birleûik-Metal 
and Çelik-ùû have tried (in vain) to challenge the MESS in order to articulate workers’ 
demands properly (interview #29 / 20.04.06, interview #33 / 25.04.06). Therefore the 
relationship between the MESS and the other unions should be considered coercive
partnership. Obviously, these coercive partnerships which have been crucial compo-
nents of the post-1980 metal sector bargaining system, could continue as long as the 
MESS and Türk-Metal retained their partnership in coercion.
Figure 2: The sectoral threshold and strengths of metal sector unions2
(Source: ÇSGB 2006) 
In order to sustain this system the MESS had to pursue a wage policy which would 
satisfy all the affiliated firms without entirely undermining Türk-Metal’s ability to con-
tain workers’ discontent. For, as pointed out by Terry, a trade union (i.e., Türk-Metal) 
would be useful for employers (i.e., the MESS) so long as it retained a degree of credi-
                                                          
2  In order to ensure that they always exceed the sectoral threshold unions deliberately in-
flate their membership figures. The sudden falls in the membership figures of all the un-
ions at 1989 and 2000 are due to the Ministry of Labor’s insistence on using the notary-
approved membership records in estimation of the official statistics in these two years. 
These falls may provide some clue as to the magnitude of forgeries in membership fig-
ures.
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bility among workers (Terry 2003: 470). The MESS could ensure this either by restor-
ing Türk-Metal’s credibility via sporadic wage concessions and thereby risking its own 
credibility among the affiliated firms, or by repressing rebelling members of Türk-
Metal before they can mobilize large part of the rank and file against Türk-Metal lead-
ership. In the next section I will show how both of these strategies were used in prac-
tice.
The limits of partnership in coercion: concessions and repressions 
The monopolization of domestic market by few firms has been the characteristic fea-
ture of the manufacturing sector in Turkey (Kepenek/Yentürk 2005: 377; Yeldan 
2001: 85) and metal industry is no exception. Accordingly, it is possible to identify two 
main groups within the MESS with different preferences for the sectoral bargaining 
policy: On the one side, large firms mainly from automotive, iron/steel and white 
goods industries with substantial share in the domestic market; on the other side, pri-
marily export-oriented middle size foundry and auto-components industry firms. The 
firms in the export-oriented group, which accept declining margins of profit in order 
to remain competitive in international markets have been proponents of low wage 
agreements while the firms in the domestic-oriented group which have more secure 
profits could afford or even propose high(er) wage agreements in order to enhance or 
benefit from their monopoly (interview #14 / 21.03.2006, interview #25 /12.04.2006, 
interview #26 / 12.04.2006). In fact one can argue that the logic of collective action 
for these two groups was different: the firms in the domestic-oriented group were 
affiliated with the MESS in order to prevent the use of wages in competition among 
themselves or precluding entry of new firms into the market while the firms in the 
export-oriented group were participating in order to prevent re-emergence of militant 
unionism and to avoid costs of confrontation with workers. Although the composi-
tion of these two groups might have changed through the post-1980 period -
automotive industry for example has become increasingly export oriented during the 
late 1990’s (interview #25 / 12.04.2006) – these two groups seems to have remained 
as the two main protagonists within the MESS. 
The MESS opted for low wages in its sectoral agreements during the 1980’s in 
order to please the export-oriented group and to expand its membership base. Ac-
cordingly, it has managed to increase the number of its affiliates to its historical maxi-
mum of 455 (see figure 3).
However, towards the end of the 1980’s the ability of Türk-Metal leadership to 
contain workers’ discontent resulting from low wages was undermined and Türk-
Metal was repeatedly accused of being a “yellow union” (Sönmezsoy/Aslıyüce 1991: 
123). Moreover from 1988 onwards large-scale wildcat industrial actions started to 
spread to whole country as manifestation of public resentment against the staunch 
neo-liberalism pursued since 1980 (Koç 1998: 154-158). This situation encouraged 
Birleûik-Metal and Çelik-ùû not to follow the usual pattern. In 1990, they refused to 
sign the agreement imposed by the MESS. As the other unions in the metal sector 
formed an alliance and indicated their willingness to take industrial action against the 
MESS in order to obtain higher wages, Türk-Metal leadership was also compelled to 
organize strikes in order to retain its credibility.  
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Obviously, by the late 1980’s as strikes and protests were permeating all sectors 
and whole country, Türk-Metal was not capable of keeping its workers in line unless 
concrete gains were provided. Consequently the entire bargaining system in the metal 
sector seemed in jeopardy. Under these conditions in two successive agreements, in 
1988 and 1991 the MESS accepted the highest wage increases of the entire post-1980 
period (see figure 4). These agreements indicated that the export-oriented middle size 
firms within the MESS have been defeated and the MESS, instead of satisfying all of 
its affiliates, preferred to protect the bargaining system by helping Türk-Metal via 
wage concessions at the expense of its own credibility. Although these wage increases 
did not satisfy Türk-Metal’s rank and file (MESS 2000: 469), they had devastating 
impact on the MESS; in 1989 under the leadership of one of the oldest MESS mem-
bers, 17 affiliated firms resigned in protest and established another employers’ organi-
zation, The Union of Metal Employers, the UME (Metal Sanayicileri ùûveren Sendi-
kası: Mesis, see figure 1), in order to challenge the MESS (Dünya, 29.06.1989) and to 
promote low-wages in the metal sector (see for example, MESùS 2001). Indeed after 
1988 MESS’ membership level started to decline so that, as depicted in figure 3 by 
1992 the MESS had already lost almost half of its affiliates. However, the bargaining 
system was saved: Türk-Metal remained as the strongest union in the sector and the 
system kept on functioning as usual. 
In 1998 the metal industry bargaining system was endangered once again. By this 
time the wage gains of the early 1990’s were lost due to high inflation and in order to 
contain workers’ discontent, and to stop other unions’ attempts of recruitment Türk-
Metal gave explicit promises to its rank and file members not to sign any agreement 
unless a satisfactory wage level was attained (interview #31 / 20.04.2006). However 
Türk-Metal leadership did not keep the promise and signed an agreement with the 
MESS which provided meagre wage increases (Radikal, 21.09.1998). As a reaction 
thousands of Türk-Metal members revolted against the leadership. They stopped 
working and walked together to the closest public notary, resigned from Türk-Metal 
and joined the other unions (Nichols and Suøur 2005: 219). In this incident, the MESS 
helped Türk-Metal by repressing the rebel workers rather than making wage conces-
sions: It urged affiliated firms to take counter measures to suppress the rebellion; ac-
cordingly workers were presented with a straightforward choice by their employers: 
those who refused to re-join Türk-Metal would be dismissed. Many workers who just 
joined the other unions grudgingly went back to Türk-Metal in order to save their jobs 
(interview #30 / 20.04.2006, interview #33 / 25.04.2006). Obviously, in this incident, 
the internal dynamics of the MESS, which should have been influenced by increasing 
export orientation of the automotive sector (interview #25 / 12.04.2006), precluded 
further wage concessions. Indeed as depicted in figure 4 after 1998 the wages in the 
metal sector would always remain under the public sector wages. In 2006 at least some 
high ranking Türk-Metal officials were concerned with increasing resentment among 
the rank and file as a result of this wage policy (interview #32 /25.04.2006).  
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Figure 3:  The MESS membership levels 
(Source: MESS 1999 /MESS 2000/MESS 2006) 
Indeed, by examining these dynamics one might conclude that any decline in the 
membership level of the MESS should be considered as a worrying development for 
Türk-Metal due to the support it receives from the MESS and its affiliates. However, 
paradoxically Türk-Metal managed to establish partnerships in coercion also with those 
firms that decided not to affiliate with the MESS or those that quitted. The next sec-
tion offers an explanation.
Figure 4:  Hourly wages in US dollars in metal and public sectors  
(Source: TùSK Statistics/my own estimations) 
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Predicament of opponents and subtle opportunities for Türk-Metal 
Usually the firms, which disaffiliated from or never joined the MESS , that is, the op-
ponents of the sectoral bargaining, consider the de facto sectoral-wage determined by 
the bargaining agreement between Türk-Metal and the MESS as wage-ceiling, meaning 
that they would usually pay less. However, these firms are permanently under the 
threat of being unionized either by Birleûik-Metal or Çelik-ùû (see figure 1), and then 
being forced to pay wages approaching to the sectoral wage or even higher. Although, 
the usual reaction of these firms to unionization attempts is to fire all affiliated work-
ers, this strategy is not always affordable especially when they produce under the “just 
in time” deals with foreign firms that oblige them to pay the costs of delays and 
thereby render them very vulnerable to any disturbance in the workplace (interview 
#28 /18.04.2006). Obviously affiliating with the MESS and thereby being protected 
from workplace level disturbances is not a solution because, for these firms, MESS’ 
sectoral agreements are already too expensive.   
This predicament provides another expansion opportunity for Türk-Metal: Offer-
ing protection from disturbance to those firms which neither could afford to affiliate 
with the MESS nor able to remain completely out of the bargaining system due to 
unionization threats of Birleûik-Metal and Çelik-ùû. Türk-Metal’s proposal is obvious: 
ensuring that the wage level would always remain under the sectoral wage and the 
other unions would be kept out of the workplace. This offer and its relative advantage 
are depicted in figure 5:  
Figure 5:
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The circled entities in figure 5 represent the components of the wage bargaining sys-
tem in the metal sector (see also figure 1). It is important to remember that bargaining 
may take place in two ways after a trade union organizes workers: employers may 
choose to bargain with the union alone or they may choose to affiliate with the MESS 
and let the MESS bargain with the union. In the latter case the firm is included in 
MESS’ group, that is, the MESS bargains with the union for all the workplaces it 
represents not only for a single workplace. Hence if a firm affiliates with the MESS it 
cannot legally undertake collective bargaining independently; the MESS would do it 
on firms’ behalf (thus position C in figure 5 is not linked with any trade union: this 
link is provided by the MESS).
In this system, the firms in position D (i.e having no direct links with the bargain-
ing system) are in danger of being forced to position A by the other unions (that is, 
being unionized by Birleûik-Metal or Çelik-ùû), which would increase their labor costs 
and reduce their flexibility. However, position C does not offer better prospects since 
it requires relinquishing the bargaining rights to the MESS and paying the sectoral 
wage. Türk-Metal offers these firms position B providing permanent protection from 
the challenge inherent in position A without risking the labor costs and loss of control 
over wage bargaining associated with position C. Given this background, the relation-
ship between Türk-Metal and employers in position B should be considered partnership 
in coercion. Obviously this type of partnership will persist as long as there are other 
trade unions, which unlike Türk-Metal, do not follow a policy of permanent appease-
ment with employers. Thus, curiously, Türk-Metal’s interests require the continuation 
of the existence and sporadic successes of its competitors Birleûik-Metal and Çelik-ùû
so as to keep employers frightened. In other words, Türk-Metal’s partnership with 
employers who are not affiliated with the MESS usually depends on these two unions’ 
ability to pose threats. Interestingly this situation provide a sort of protection for these 
unions: Türk-Metal seems to refrain from informing the Ministry of Labor as to pos-
sible forgeries in the membership figures of Birleûik-Metal and Çelik-ùû which might 
cause these unions to be disqualified from bargaining due to failure to meet 10 percent 
sectoral representation threshold (interview #32 / 24.04.2006) 
The story of KERUT, an export oriented foundry firm employing around 1000 
workers, is a good example of how Türk-Metal uses the threats posed by other unions 
for its own benefit: KERUT, shortly after its disaffiliation from the MESS in 1989 
(i.e., from position C) in protest against the wage concessions of 1988, decided to 
force the union (Türk-Metal) out of its workplaces in order to free itself from any 
restriction regarding the wages (thus it moved to position D). After years of non-
union existence, the general manager of KERUT was informed about the attempts of 
Birleûik-Metal to unionize its workers (facing the danger of being forced to position 
A). He “immediately fired all the leaders of this attempt” but at the end in order to 
prevent further incursions from other trade unions he made all his workers members 
of Türk-Metal (moving to position B) (interview #11 / 14.03.2006). According to 
Türk-Metal, KERUT and Türk-Metal have “a perfect relationship” ever since (inter-
view #6 / 08.03.2006).
Another example is the auto-supplements producer WOLVIL which employs 
around 100 workers and produces half-finished auto parts mainly for foreign contrac-
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tors. According to WOLVIL’s manager affiliating with the MESS is senseless given 
that “Türk-Metal ensures much lower wages than the lowest possible with the MESS” 
(interview #28 /18.04.2006).  
Here it is important to note that this is not the only way Türk-Metal enters the 
workplaces. There were also genuine struggles undertaken by Türk-Metal to unionize 
firms (forcing them to choose between position C and B), whereas these firms prefer 
to preserve position D at all costs and thus fire any worker who joins any union in-
cluding Türk-Metal (interview #32 /25.04.2006). However, it is clear that Türk-Metal 
remains the first choice of employers if they can no longer avoid the bargaining sys-
tem (either in position C or in B).  
Therefore one can see that, during the post-1980 period Türk-Metal was not en-
tirely depended on the support it received from the MESS, it also managed to become 
attractive for those employers who were not participating in MESS’ sectoral bargain-
ing. In other words Türk-Metal has established partnerships in coercion with employers 
both at sectoral and workplace levels.
Although, this ultimate employer friendliness of Türk-Metal creates tension be-
tween Türk-Metal leadership and the rank and file, up to now Türk-Metal has been 
able to convince and/or coerce its members to retain their membership by using four 
strategies: 1) offering positive incentives to its supporters such as free holidays in lux-
ury Türk-Metal residences (Nichols and Sugur 2004: 222), 2) appealing to nationalism 
in order to justify concessions, 3) threatening revolting workers with dismissal 4) occa-
sionally resorting to actual physical violence (interview #30 / 20.04.2006). 
Discussion
This analysis leads to two important questions: why did Türk-Metal become the partner 
in coercion but not the others? And, to what extent partnership patterns in the metal 
sector can be used to make generalizations about other sectors in Turkey? I will try to 
discuss these questions one by one:  
Explaining trade union strategies 
In order to understand the strategic choices of trade unions it is essential to make a 
sensitive analysis of the politics of leadership (Boxall/Haynes 1997: 570-571). There-
fore in order to answer the question of why Türk-Metal becomes the partner in coercion
while Birleûik-Metal and Çelik-ùû remain as coerced partners?, we should first examine the 
relative power of leadership in these trade unions. 
Unlike Birleûik-Metal and Çelik-ùû, Türk-Metal has been governed by the same 
president during the last 32 years. Mustafa Özbek, never-changing president of Türk-
Metal since 1975, rules with an “iron hand” by appointing his men to all the key posts 
and portrayed as a great leader (Nichols et al. 2002: 37). Not surprisingly Türk-Metal is 
sometimes referred to as “Özbek’s trade union” (Sönmezsoy/Aslıyüce 1991). Simi-
larly, while both Birleûik-Metal and Çelik-ùû emphasize their strict adherence to de-
mocratic elections at workplace level (interview # 29 / 20.04.2006, interview # 30 / 
20.04.2006, interview # 33 / 25.04.2006), Türk-Metal leadership strictly controls the 
elections of delegates in workplaces who in turn determine local branch officials 
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(Nichols et al. 2002: 39). In this way the domination of the Türk-Metal leadership over 
rank and file is ensured at workplace and local levels.  
Taking these into account one can argue that Birleûik-Metal and Çelik-ùû could 
not be partners in coercion with employers due to their democratic internal governance 
which has prevented the emergence of a ruling group whose interests can be detached 
from those of rank and file. The exact opposite is true for Türk-Metal: lack of internal 
democracy created an elite group which, in turn, further undermined internal democ-
racy by using authoritarian measures ranging from the threat of dismissal to actual 
physical violence. Consequently, the interests of the leadership have become separable 
from those of the members, and this situation rendered partnership in coercion a prefer-
able and tenable strategy for Türk-Metal.  
However, it is important to note that although the lack of internal democracy dis-
tinguished Türk-Metal from other unions and made it a candidate for partnership in 
coercion, Türk-Metal has become the partner in coercion both at sectoral and work-
place level because employers were actually looking for such a relationship. Thus 
Türk-Metal’s strategy cannot be explained without reference to the employers’ mo-
tives for sectoral and workplace level partnership: for “it takes two to tango” (Fran-
zosi 2004: 3). One can argue that the relative protection of large metal industry firms 
from international competition due to their monopoly rendered employers’ collective 
control over labor costs (either for preventing competition or precluding new com-
petitors’ entry to the market) a feasible employer strategy, and thereby created the 
need for a partnership in coercion with a trade union at sectoral level. However the 
opposite is true for the workplace level: as shown above, due to their exposure to 
international competition, some firms were permanently concerned with labor costs 
and industrial peace but they were disturbed by Birleûik-Metal and Çelik-ùû’s unioniza-
tion efforts. Hence they too needed a trade union as their partner in coercion.  
Obviously without the restrictive legal environment of the post-1980 period 
which enforced trade unions to be permanently occupied with recruitment under con-
stant job insecurity, neither Türk-Metal’s lack of democracy nor employers’ motives 
would suffice to create partnerships in coercion in the metal sector. In fact most likely 
outcome of repealing the threshold conditions (the backbone of the post-1980 laws) 
would be quick disintegration of Türk-Metal given that both Türk-Metal and employ-
ers consider any such legal change as disastrous and unacceptable (interview #10 / 
13.03.2006, interview # 32 / 24.04.2006, MESS ùûveren Gazetesi, 01.07.2000).  
Therefore, although Türk-Metal’s role as the only partner in coercion can be ex-
plained by its lack of democracy, the partnership in coercion in general cannot be ac-
counted for without referring to legal environment and employers’ motives.  
Patterns of partnership in other sectors 
The emergence of coercive partnerships should be considered likely in all industries in 
Turkey given that the legal environment which generates the necessary conditions 
remains the same across 28 official sectors (with some exceptions in agriculture, bank-
ing, healthcare, transport and arms industries). But can we make a similar generaliza-
tion for partnership in coercion by drawing on the findings in the metal sector? 
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I would argue that, for sake of prudence, one should use conditions prevailing in 
the metal sector as reference only to establish some hypotheses for other sectors to be 
tested by further inquiry. Accordingly, at the risk of oversimplification, one can argue 
that, in the post-1980 legal environment, the existence of a strict sectoral bargaining 
policy and more than one trade union in a sector may generate partnership in coercion at 
sectoral level between sectoral employers’ organization and one of the trade unions. On 
the other hand, if exposure to international markets can be added to this sectoral pic-
ture, partnership in coercion at workplace level between individual employers and a trade 
union can also be considered a likely outcome. Clearly, the necessary ingredient for 
both variants is to have a trade union with dubious internal democracy. In Turkey 
trade unions are affiliated to one of the three national confederations. Two of these 
TÜRK-ùú and DùSK are already mentioned; the third one is liberal-Islamic HAK-ùú
(for details see Duran/Yıldırım 2005; Buøra 2002). The trade unions affiliated to 
TÜRK-ùú (like Türk-Metal) have a tradition of never-changing presidents (Nichols 
and Sugur 2005: 214-215), and therefore, perhaps, TÜRK-ùú affiliation may be taken 
as rough indicator of relative lack of internal democracy. Thus, once again at the risk 
of simplification, one can argue that the trade unions affiliated with TÜRK-ùú are 
more likely to have dubious internal democracy than the DùSK and HAK-ùú affiliates.  
By taking all these factors into account, one can generate some hypotheses: if in a 
sector, a: there is a sectoral bargaining policy; b: there are more than one bargaining 
trade unions the biggest of which is affiliated with TÜRK-ùú, and c: sector is exposed 
to international competition, one may expect partnerships in coercion to emerge both 
at sectoral and workplace level between TÜRK-ùú affiliated trade union and employ-
ers. If only a and b are satisfied then partnership in coercion at sectoral level is to be 
expected. However, if only b and c are satisfied then partnership in coercion at work-
place level seems to be likely.   
The application of this scheme to three important sectors in Turkey, namely, 
construction, chemicals, and textile/clothing sectors, which together with metal indus-
try, employ approximately 45 percent of the entire formal workforce (see figure 6 
panel 1) is as follows:
Construction sector (see figure 6 panel 2b) 
Unlike the MESS, employers’ organization in the construction industry, the ùNTES 
(ùnûaat Sanayicileri Sendikası) neither has a sectoral bargaining policy nor interested in 
establishing one. There is only one bargaining union in this sector Yol-ùû which is 
affiliated with TÜRK-ùú and construction firms in Turkey are not exposed to interna-
tional competition (interview # 2 / 22.02.2006). Obviously none of the specific condi-
tions of metal sector (that is, a, b and c) exists in the construction sector; thus partner-
ship in coercion is not likely to emerge in this sector at any level. 
Chemicals sector (see figure 6 panel 2a)
The employers’ organization in the chemicals industry, the KùPLAS (Türkiye Kimya, 
Petrol, Lastik ve Plastik Sanayii ùûverenleri Sendikası) does not pursue a sectoral wage 
policy either. It just provides guidelines (interview # 16 / 27.03.2006) and firms in the 
chemicals industry can be considered relatively sheltered from international competi-
Industrielle Beziehungen, 14. Jg., Heft 3, 2007   265 
0 5 10 15 20 25
0
5
1
0
2
0
sectors
p
e
rc
e
n
ta
g
e
 o
f 
w
o
rk
fo
rc
e
Panel 1
Chemicals
Textile-Clothing
Metal
Construction
0 10 20 30 40 50
0
4
0
8
0
trade unions
u
n
io
n
iz
a
ti
o
n
 p
e
rc
e
n
ta
g
e
s
Panel 2aChemicals
Petrol-Is
(TURK-IS)
Lastik-Is
(DISK)
Textile-Clothing
Oz-Iplik-Is
(HAK-IS)
Teksif
(TURK-IS)
Tekstil
(DISK)
Metal
Celik-Is
(HAK-IS)
Turk-Metal
(TURK-IS)
Birlesik-Metal
(DISK)
Sectoral
threshold
60 70 80 90
0
4
0
8
0
trade unions
u
n
io
n
iz
a
ti
o
n
 p
e
rc
e
n
ta
g
e
s
Panel 2bConstruction
Yol-Is
(TURK-IS)
Sectoral
threshold
tion due to increasing domestic demand for their products (DPT 2004: 36, 50). There 
are two trade unions in this sector biggest of which is TÜRK-ùú affiliate Petrol-ùû.
Obviously, only condition b is satisfied but this is not sufficient to expect partnership 
in coercion to emerge either at workplace or sectoral level.  
Figure 6: Industrial relations in Turkey in 2006:  
Panel 1: relative employment share of sectors 
Panel 2a/2b: sectoral thresholds and official representation capacities of trade un-
ions across sectors, note that some trade unions are not visible because of their very 
small representation capacity (Source: ÇSGB 2007) 
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Textile/clothing sector (see figure 6 panel 2a)
Like the MESS, employers’ organization in the textile/clothing industry, the TÜTSùS
(Türkiye Tekstil Sanayii ùûverenleri Sendikası) has a very strict sectoral bargaining pol-
icy (interview # 20 / 29.03.2006). There are three bargaining unions in this sector 
biggest of which, Teksif, is affiliated with TÜRK-ùú and textile/clothing firms are 
exposed to fierce international competition especially after 2005 when quotes were 
globally removed (DPT 2004: 22-23). Obviously all of the conditions (that is, a, b and 
c) are satisfied in the textile/clothing sector, thus one may expect partnerships in co-
ercion to emerge both at sectoral and workplace level. But how accurate are these 
hypotheses? Indeed at first glance the textile and clothing and metal sector bargaining 
dynamics appear to be quite similar: the TÜTSùS, like the MESS, first reaches a sec-
toral agreement with Teksif (a TÜRK-ùú affiliate like Türk-Metal) and then forces the 
other unions (Öz-ùplik-ùû and Tekstil) to accept this agreement unconditionally (inter-
view # 20 / 29.03.2006). However the examination of trade unions’ behavior in the 
textile/clothing sector reveals discrepancies between the metal and the textile/clothing 
sectors; for example unlike metal sector, there is no fierce hostility between trade un-
ions in the textile/clothing sector (interview # 31 / 20.04.2006, interview # 34 / 
27.04.2006) Moreover Teksif, unlike Türk-Metal, occasionally cooperates with other 
trade unions in order to challenge TÜTSùS (Tekstil ùûveren, 01.12.1998). Indeed Tek-
sif’s cooperation with the TÜTSùS resembles to coercive partnership rather than partner-
ship in coercion. Thus despite similarities with the metal sector, the exact nature of part-
nership relations in the textile and clothing sector can be thoroughly understood only 
by further inquiry on employers’ demands and internal governance of trade unions in 
this sector.
This brief examination of three other sectors in Turkey shows that, there is quite 
a variation in the sectoral bargaining dynamics, thus the partnership patterns, espe-
cially the partnership in coercion prevailing in the metal sector should not be used to make 
generalizations about other sectors without detailed sector-specific inquiries.   
Conclusion  
In this paper, I examined a particular variant of partnership between employers and 
trade unions: partnership in coercion, a relationship which serves the interests of employ-
ers and trade unions while ignoring or infringing those of workers. It is shown that 
this type of relationship between employers and trade unions may emerge under con-
ditions which are likely to generate coercive partnerships, namely, job insecurity and 
anti-union legal environment. However the distinctive factors that make partnership 
in coercion possible appear to be threefold: employers’ demands resulting from their 
market positions, weak trade union internal democracy and competition among trade 
unions.
The analysis of partnership in coercion confirms an important proposition: if tra-
de unions entirely loose their credibility among workers they also loose their utility for 
employers (Terry 2003: 470). It is shown that the trade union, Türk-Metal, which is 
involved in partnership in coercion both at sectoral and workplace level, faced at least 
two such crises during the post-1980 period and on both occasions employers aided 
Türk-Metal to restore its credibility and authority. Therefore there is a paradoxical 
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cal outcome: although the detachment of the interests of union leadership from those 
of members is one of the preconditions which render partnership in coercion possi-
ble, the complete disregard of members’ interests would make partnership in coercion 
untenable in the long run. Thus both employers and trade unions involved in such a 
relationship must be aware of and carefully calculate the limits of the rank and file’s 
tolerance. 
Two assumptions as to partnership, however, are not confirmed by the analysis 
of partnership in coercion: First, it is shown that the assumption that the ability and 
willingness of trade unions to oppose employers would prevent partnerships between 
employers and trade unions from becoming unfavorable for workers (Ashwin 2004: 
42; Haynes/Allen 2001: 182) is based on a simple understanding of partnership rela-
tions which disregards the interdependency between the strategies of different trade 
unions. For, as presented above, Türk-Metal’s partnership in coercion with employers 
at workplace level usually depends on the seriousness of the threat posed by other 
trade unions which are competing with Türk-Metal. This means that threats posed by 
some trade unions may be used by others in order to establish partnerships which are 
unfavorable for workers. Second, the claim that trade unions would be only reluctantly 
and temporarily be involved in partnerships which are detrimental to furtherance of 
workers’ interests (Lucio/Stuart 2005: 809) proved to be inaccurate in this analysis . 
For it is revealed that trade unions may voluntarily choose to establish such a partner-
ship with employers, like Türk-Metal, which has become and remains as partner in 
coercion by its own will, while other trade unions try to challenge employers’ domina-
tion.  
Obviously, it is possible to consider partnership in coercion as a peculiarity prevailing 
only in Turkey’s metal sector which is difficult to find elsewhere. However, it may be 
more useful to consider this pattern as an extreme form of partnership which may 
reveal some aspects of ‘usual’ partnership more clearly. If this claim is tenable, then it 
is possible to argue that the mutual dependency between partnership in coercion and coer-
cive partnership, and how both of these modes are simultaneously generated by the legal 
framework, employers’ demands, competition among trade unions and trade unions’ 
internal governance, point out that the nature of partnership between employers and 
trade unions is determined by complex interdependencies. Thus it cannot be ac-
counted for by focusing only on power relations and intentions at any single level such 
as workplace. Accordingly, one may argue that the dynamics of a partnership relation 
between a particular employer and trade union is likely to be influenced by factors and 
actors that are different from and beyond the immediate control of actual partners. In 
other words the form of partnership is an outcome of the interdependencies within a 
bargaining system so that it is not something whose evolution and merits are deter-
mined entirely by the parties directly involved. Therefore, perhaps the outcome of 
partnership itself, too, should be considered as not entirely predictable from, and de-
pendent on, the partners most directly involved.   
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